| Lecturer Profile |
Miroslaw Kutylowski received Master degree in mathematics (foundations of mathematics) in 1980, Ph.D. (recursion theory) in 1985, Habilitation (automata and computational complexity) in 1992 from University of Wroclaw. Status of professor (given by Polish President) in 1999. For many years, he was with University of Wroclaw, Computer Science Institute, he was leading Algorithms and Complexity Research Group. His current research interests include: algorithms for parallel, distributed and ad hoc systems, anonymous communication, security and cryptography, e-law. He has published more than 100 papers in international journals and conferences. He was the Laureate of the MISTRZ Programme, technical sciences, Foundation for Polish Science 2009. He also received the IBM Faculty Award 2012 and the PIIT Award 2014 (award of Polish Chamber of Information Technology and Telecommunications). |
| Lecture Abstract |
Security given by cryptographic schemes as usually overestimated -- while in theory there might be even formal security proofs, there are many ways the things to go wrong: the security model used for the proof may not cover certain attack scenarios, the implementation may differ from the idealized scheme description, under-specification of the scheme may leave room for critical errors at the implementation phase. Last not least, the presumably trusted parties involved in the scheme may turn out to be malicious and misuse cryptography to create trapdoors and attack other protocol participants. These threats have been neglected for decades. Even if the concept of kleptography is 20 years old, not much has been done to avoid these threats. In the meantime, the modern society became more and more dependant on IT systems with cryptographic protection measures playing the critical role. There are many examples how to exploit such possibilities -- during the talk we shall discuss these issues for electronic signature and authentication protocols, which are either widely deployed or planned for deployment. We show a couple of pragmatic techniques that can be used to defer these threats. |
